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Abstract—We consider a wireless communication system that
consists of a transmitter, a receiver, and an adversary. The
transmitter transmits signals with different modulation types,
while the receiver classifies its received signals to modulation
types using a deep learning-based classifier. In the meantime, the
adversary makes over-the-air transmissions that are received as
superimposed with the transmitter’s signals to fool the classifier
at the receiver into making errors. While this evasion attack
has received growing interest recently, the channel effects from
the adversary to the receiver have been ignored so far such that
the previous attack mechanisms cannot be applied under realistic
channel effects. In this paper, we present how to launch a realistic
evasion attack by considering channels from the adversary to
the receiver. Our results show that modulation classification is
vulnerable to an adversarial attack over a wireless channel that
is modeled as Rayleigh fading with path loss and shadowing. We
present various adversarial attacks with respect to availability
of information about channel, transmitter input, and classifier
architecture. First, we present two types of adversarial attacks,
namely a targeted attack (with minimum power) and non-
targeted attack that aims to change the classification to a target
label or to any other label other than the true label, respectively.
Both are white-box attacks that are transmitter input-specific
and use channel information. Then we introduce an algorithm to
generate adversarial attacks using limited channel information
where the adversary only knows the channel distribution. Finally,
we present a black-box universal adversarial perturbation (UAP)
attack where the adversary has limited knowledge about both
channel and transmitter input. By accounting for different
levels of information availability, we show the vulnerability of
modulation classifier to over-the-air adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in deep learning (DL) based on deep neural
networks (DNNs) have supported numerous applications to
learn from complex data domains such as in computer vision
and speech recognition [1]. Following the success of these
applications, DL has been applied to wireless communica-
tions, where channel, interference, and traffic effects jointly
contribute to the high complexity of the spectrum data [2].
Machine learning (ML) in the presence of adversaries have
been studied in the context of adversarial machine learning
[3]. In particular, DNNs are known to be highly susceptible
to adversarial attacks, as demonstrated with applications in
computer vision domain [4].
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Recently, adversarial ML has been studied in wireless
communication systems using DNNs. Exploratory (inference)
attacks have been considered in [5], where an adversary builds
a DNN to learn the transmission pattern in the channel and jam
transmissions that would be otherwise successful. Over-the-air
spectrum poisoning (causative) attacks have been considered
in [6], where an adversary poisons (falsifies) a transmitter’s
spectrum sensing data over the air by transmitting during the
short spectrum sensing period of the transmitter. Trojan attacks
have been studied in [7] against a signal classifier, where
an adversary slightly manipulates training data by inserting
Trojans in terms of modifying the phases and the labels of
only few training data to a target label, and then transmits
signals with the same phase shift in the inference time to fool
the signal classifier.
Built upon adversarial ML, adversarial attacks (a.k.a eva-
sion attacks) correspond to small modifications of the original
input to the DNNs that make DL algorithm to misclassify the
input. These small modifications are not just random noise
but carefully designed in a way that changes the decision of
the DL algorithm. As an evasion attack, [8] has showed that
the end-to-end autoencoder communication systems, proposed
in [9], are vulnerable to adversarial attacks in an additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel environment, where
the attack increases the block-error-rate at the receiver. Also,
adversarial attacks have been studied for modulation clas-
sification of wireless signals in [10], where fast gradient
method (FGM) [11] is used to generate adversarial attacks.
Specifically, targeted FGM attack has been used by enforcing
the DNNs to misclassify the input signals to a target label.
Here, the target is decided by searching over all possible
target labels and selecting the one with the least perturbation
required to enforce misclassification. It has been shown that
the modulation classifier used in [12] incurs major errors due
to adversarial attacks in the AWGN channel.
Similar evasion attacks and corresponding defense mech-
anisms have been studied in [13]–[18]. Previous work has
considered the AWGN channel from the transmitter to the
receiver only, but has not considered channel effects (path loss
or fading) from the adversary to the receiver. However, even
a small channel effect would significantly reduce the impact
of adversarial attacks by reducing the received perturbation
power just below the necessary level such that the adversarial
attack fails in changing classification decision over the air.
In this paper, we consider a wireless communication system
where a DNN is used to classify wireless signals to modulation
types as in [10], and show how to make this classifier vulner-
able to adversarial attacks even in the presence of realistic
channel effects from the adversary to the receiver. For that
purpose, we design adversarial attacks with a power constraint
that decreases the accuracy of detecting modulation type at the
receiver. We first propose two white-box attacks, a targeted
attack with minimum power and a non-targeted attack, subject
to channel effects known by the adversary. We show that the
adversarial attack fails if the channel between the adversary
and the receiver is not considered (as in [10], [13]–[17]) when
designing the adversarial attack. Then we show how to design
the adversarial attack by accounting for known channel effects.
Next, we relax the assumption that the adversary knows the
exact channel condition and present a white-box adversarial
attack with limited channel information available at the ad-
versary. Finally, we design a black-box universal adversarial
perturbation (UAP) attack, where the adversary has limited
information about the transmitter input, channel conditions,
and the classifier architecture. All these attacks demonstrate
the importance of channel effects on attack performance and
raise the need to utilize channel information in designing
adversarial attacks and launching them over the air.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II ex-
plains the system model. Sections III and IV describe targeted
and non-targeted white-box adversarial attacks, respectively,
using channel information. Section V considers the white-box
adversarial attack with limited channel information. Section
VI describes a universal adversarial perturbation. Section VII
presents simulation results. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless communication system that consists
of a transmitter, a receiver, and an adversary. The transmitter
transmits signals with one of the modulation types. The re-
ceiver applies a pre-trained DL-based classifier on the received
signals to classify the modulation type that is used at the
transmitter. The adversary launches an attack by transmitting
over the air to cause misclassification at the receiver.
The DNN classifier at the receiver is denoted by f(·; θ) :
X → RC , where θ is the parameters of the DNN and C
is the number of modulation types. Note X ⊂ Cp, where p
is the dimension of the complex-valued (in-phase/quadrature)
inputs that can be also represented by concatenation of two
real-valued inputs. The classifier f assigns a modulation type
lˆ(x, θ) = argmaxk fk(x, θ) to every input x ∈ X . In this for-
mulation, fk(x, θ) is the output of classifier f corresponding
to the kth modulation type.
There exist the channel htr from the transmitter to the
receiver and the channel har from the adversary to the
receiver, where htr = [htr,1, htr,2, · · ·, htr,p]T ∈ Cp×1 and
har = [har,1, har,2, · · ·, har,p]T ∈ Cp×1. If the transmitter
transmits x, the receiver receives rt = Htrx+ n, if there is
no adversarial attack, or receives ra = Htrx+Harδ+n, if the
transmitter launches an adversarial attack by transmitting the
perturbation signal δ, where Htr = diag{htr,1, · · ·, htr,p} ∈
C
p×p,Har = diag{har,1, · · ·, har,p} ∈ Cp×p, δ ∈ Cp×1 and
n ∈ Cp×1 is complex Gaussian noise. For a stealth (i.e.,
difficult to detect) attack, the adversarial perturbation δ is
restricted as ||δ||22 ≤ Pmax for some suitable power Pmax. The
adversary obtains the adversarial perturbation δ for the input x
and classifier f by solving the following optimization problem:
max
δ
I{lˆ(rt, θ) 6= lˆ(ra, θ)}
subject to ||δ||22 ≤ Pmax, (1)
where I{·} is an indicator function.
In practice solving (1) is difficult. Thus, different meth-
ods have been proposed (primarily in the computer vision
domain) to approximate the adversarial perturbation such as
FGM. FGM is a computationally efficient method for crafting
adversarial attacks by linearizing the loss function of the
DNN classifier. Let L(θ,x,y) denote the loss function of the
model, where y ∈ {0, 1}C is the label vector. Then FGM
linearizes the loss function in a neighborhood of x and uses
this linearized function for optimization.
There are two types of attacks called targeted attacks and
non-targeted attacks that involve different objective functions
to optimize. In a targeted attack, the adversary is trying to
generate a perturbation that causes the classifier at the receiver
to have a specific misclassification, e.g., the classifier classifies
QPSK modulation as QAM16, whereas in non-targeted FGM
attack, the adversary is searching for a perturbation that causes
any misclassification (independent of target label). We will
further explain these two types of attacks in the next section.
Our goal in this paper is to design an attack to fool the
classifier at the receiver while considering the channel effects
and satisfying the power constraint at the adversary. For the
white-box adversarial attacks, we assume that the adversary
knows the architecture (θ and L(·)) of the classifier at the
receiver. Also, we assume that the adversary knows the input
at the receiver and consequently the channel har between the
adversary and the receiver. We will relax these assumptions in
the later part of the paper.
III. TARGETED WHITE-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
USING CHANNEL INFORMATION
For the targeted attack, the adversary minimizes
L(θ, ra,y
target) with respect to δ, where ytarget is
one-hot encoded desired target class. FGM is used
to linearize the loss function as L(θ, ra,y
target) ≈
L(θ, rt,y
target) + (Harδ)
T∇xL(θ, rt,ytarget) that is
minimized by setting Harδ = −α∇xL(θ, rt,ytarget),
where α is a scaling factor to constrain the adversarial
perturbation power to Pmax.
The adversary can generate different targeted attacks with
respect to different ytarget that causes the classifier at the
receiver to misclassify the received signals to C − 1 different
modulation types. Thus, as in [10], the adversary can create
targeted attacks for all C − 1 modulation types and chooses
the target modulation that uses the least power. However, [10]
only considered the AWGN channel, i.e.,Har = I, which falls
short from representing channel conditions encountered in real
wireless communication systems. We call the targeted attack
perturbation in [10] as δNoCh, which is an optimal targeted
attack under the AWGN channel. The detailed algorithm is
given in Algorithm 1 by setting Har = I. In the following
subsections, we propose three targeted adversarial attacks to
overcome the random effects of the channel.
A. Channel Inversion Attack
We first begin with a naive attack, where the adversary
designs its attack by inverting the channel in the optimal tar-
geted attack δNoCh, which is obtained using Algorithm 1 with
the AWGN channel. Since the adversarial attack goes through
channel har, the ith element of the perturbation δ is simply
designed as δi =
δNoChi
har,i
so that after going through the channel
it has the same direction as δNoChi for i = 1, ···, p. Furthermore,
in order to satisfy the power constraint Pmax, we introduce a
scaling factor α so that δdiv = −αδ, where α =
√
Pmax
||δ||2 to
satisfy the power constraint at the adversary. Thus, the attack
received at the receiver is Harδ
div = −αδNoCh.
B. Minimum Mean Squared Error (MMSE) Attack
In the MMSE attack, the adversary designs the perturbation
δMMSE so that the distance between the attack after going
through the channel and the optimal targeted attack over
AWGN channel is minimized. By designing the attack in this
way, the received attack at the receiver is close to the optimal
targeted attack as much as possible while satisfying the power
constraint at the adversary. However, since the classifier is
sensitive to not only the direction but also the power of
perturbation, the squared error criterion might penalize the
candidates of δMMSE, which have more power with the direc-
tion of δNoCh, i.e., δMMSE = γδNoCh. Therefore, we formulate
the optimization problem to select the perturbation δMMSE as
min
δMMSE
||HarδMMSE − γδNoCh||22
subject to ||δMMSE||22 ≤ Pmax, (2)
where γ is optimized by line search. We can write (2) as
min
δMMSE
i
p∑
i=1
||har,iδMMSEi − γδNoChi ||22
subject to
p∑
i=1
||δMMSEi ||22 ≤ Pmax. (3)
We solve the convex optimization problem (3) by using
Lagrangian method. The Lagrangian for (3) is given by
L =
p∑
i=1
||har,iδMMSEi −γδNoChi ||22+λ
(
p∑
i=1
||δMMSEi ||22−Pmax
)
,
(4)
where λ ≥ 0. The KKT conditions are given by
h∗ar,i(har,iδ
MMSE
i − γδNoChi ) + λδMMSEi = 0, (5)
Algorithm 1 MRPP attack
1: Inputs: input rt, desired accuracy εacc, power constraint
Pmax and model of the classifier
2: Initialize: ε← 0C×1
3: for class-index c in range(C) do
4: εmax ← Pmax, εmin ← 0
5: δcnorm =
H
∗
ar∇xL(θ,rt,yc)
(||H∗ar∇xL(θ,rt,yc)||2)
6: while εmax − εmin > εacc do
7: εavg ← (εmax + εmin)/2
8: xadv ← x− εavgHarδcnorm
9: if lˆ(xadv) == ltrue then
10: εmin ← εavg
11: else
12: εmax ← εavg
13: end if
14: end while
15: ε[c] = εmax
16: end for
17: target = argmin ε, δMRPP = −√Pmaxδtargetnorm
for all i = 1, · · ·, p. From KKT conditions, we obtain the
perturbation of the MMSE attack as
δMMSEi = −
γh∗ar,iδ
NoCh
i
h∗ar,ihar,i + λ
, (6)
for all i = 1, · · ·, p, where λ is determined by the power
constraint at the adversary. Note that the received perturbation
at the receiver is Harδ
MMSE = −αTδNoCh where α ∈ Rp×1
and each element of α is αi =
γhar,ih
∗
ar,i
h∗
ar,i
har,i+λ
.
C. Maximum Received Perturbation Power (MRPP) Attack
In the MRPP attack, the adversary selects the perturbation
δMRPP to maximize the received perturbation power at the
receiver and analyzes how the received perturbation power
affects the decision process of the classifier. To maximize the
received perturbation power and effectively fool the classifier
into making a specific classification error, the adversary has
to fully utilize the channel between the adversary and the
receiver. Thus, if the targeted attack δtargeti is multiplied by the
conjugate of the channel, h∗ar,i, then the received perturbation
after going through the channel becomes ||har,i||22δtargeti . In this
attack, not only the direction is unaffected after going through
the channel but also the power is maximized by utilizing the
channel. Finally, the adversary generates targeted attack for
every possible modulation type to decide the target class and
calculate the scaling factor to satisfy the power constraint at
the adversary. The details are presented in Algorithm 1.
IV. NON-TARGETED WHITE-BOX ADVERSARIAL
ATTACKS USING CHANNEL INFORMATION
In this section, the adversary designs the attack based on
the non-targeted attack and its objective is to maximize the
Algorithm 2 Crafting naive non-targeted attack
1: Inputs: number of epochs E, power constraint Pmax, true
label ytrue and model of the classifier
2: Initialize: Sum of gradient ∆← 0 , x← rt
3: for epoch e in range(E) do
4: δnorm =
∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)
(||∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)||2)
5: x← x+
√
Pmax
E
Harδnorm
6: ∆← ∆+
√
Pmax
E
δnorm
7: end for
8: δnaive =
√
Pmax
∆
||∆||2
loss function L(θ, ra,y
true), where ytrue is the true label of x.
FGM is used to linearize the loss function as L(θ, ra,y
true) ≈
L(θ, rt,y
true) + (Harδ)
T∇xL(θ, rt,ytrue) that is maximized
by setting Harδ = α∇xL(θ, rt,ytrue), where α is a scaling
factor to constrain the adversarial perturbation power to Pmax.
Based on FGM for the non-targeted attack, we propose non-
targeted adversarial attacks to effectively attack the classifier
at the receiver.
A. Naive Non-Targeted Attack
As in the targeted attacks, we begin with the naive non-
targeted attack. First, the adversary divides its power Pmax into
E epochs and uses Pmax
E
amount of power to the gradient of
loss function to tilt the transmitted signal from the transmitter.
Next, the adversary calculates the gradient again with respect
to the transmitted signal from the transmitter and added
perturbation. Then the adversary adds another perturbation
with power Pmax
E
using the new gradient. This scheme generates
the best direction to increase the loss function at that specific
instance. Finally, the adversary repeats this procedure E times
and sums all the gradients of the loss function that were
added to the transmitted signal from the transmitter since the
adversary can send only one perturbation at a time over the
air. Finally, a scaling factor is introduced to satisfy the power
constraint at the adversary. The details of this algorithm are
presented in Algorithm 2.
B. Minimum Mean Squared Error (MMSE) Attack
The non-targeted MMSE attack is designed similar to the
targeted MMSE attack. The adversary first obtains δNoCh from
the naive non-targeted attack withHar = I and uses it to solve
problem (2). Thus, the solution is the same as the solution to
(2) except that it has the opposite direction to maximize the
loss function, whereas the loss function is minimized for the
targeted attack case. Therefore, the perturbation selected by the
MMSE scheme for non-targeted attack is δMMSE = αTδNoCh,
where α ∈ Rp and each element of α is αi = γh
∗
ar,i
h∗
ar,i
har,i+λ
.
C. Maximum Received Perturbation Power (MRPP) Attack
As we have seen in the targeted MRPP attack, the attack
should be in the form of δMRPP = H∗arδ
target to maximize
the received perturbation power at the receiver. Thus, the
Algorithm 3 Crafting adversarial attack with limited channel
information
1: Inputs: N channel realization {H(1)ar , · · ·,H(N)ar }, input rt
and model of the classifier
2: Initialize: ∆← 0
3: for n in range(N ) do
4: Find δ(n) from white-box attack algorithm using rt and
H
(n)
ar
5: Stack δ(n) to ∆
6: end for
7: Compute the first principle direction v1 of ∆ using PCA
8: ∆ = UΣVT and v1 = Ve1
9: δlimited =
√
Pmaxv1
naive non-targeted attack is changed to create the MRPP
non-targeted attack by changing δnorm in Algorithm 2 to
H
∗
ar∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)
(||H∗ar∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)||2) .
V. WHITE-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACK WITH LIMITED
CHANNEL INFORMATION
The adversarial attacks that are designed in the previous
sections use the exact channel information. However, this may
not always be the case in practical scenarios. Therefore, in
this section, we propose an algorithm to generate adversarial
attacks using principal component analysis (PCA) with limited
channel information, i.e., distribution of the channel. PCA was
also used in [10] for the AWGN channel case only. PCA is
performed by eigenvalue decomposition of the data covariance
matrix or singular value decomposition of a data matrix and is
used to obtain the principal component which has the largest
variance. In other words, PCA finds the principal component
that provides the most information about the data with reduced
dimension by projecting the data onto it.
To generate an adversarial attack with limited channel
information, we first generate N realizations of the channel
between the adversary and the receiver {H(1)ar ,H(2)ar , ···,H(N)ar }
from a known distribution. Then we generate N adversarial
attacks using white-box attack algorithms from the previous
sections, either targeted or non-targeted, using N realizations
of the channel and the known input at the classifier rt.
Finally, we stack N generated adversarial attacks in a matrix
and find the principal component of the matrix to use it as
the adversarial attack with limited channel information. The
details are presented in Algorithm 3.
VI. UNIVERSAL ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
In the previous sections, the adversary designs a white-box
attack with the assumptions that it knows the architecture of
the classifier at the receiver, the channel between the adversary
and the receiver, and the exact input at the receiver. However,
these assumptions are not always practical in real wireless
communications systems. Thus, in this section, we relax these
assumptions and propose UAP attacks.
A. Universal Adversarial Attack with Pre-Collected Input at
the Receiver
Here, we first relax the assumption that the adversary knows
the exact input of the classifier. The adversary in the previous
attacks generates an input-dependent perturbation, i.e., δ is
designed given the exact input rt. This requires the adversary
to always know the input of the classifier, which is not a
practical assumption to make due to synchronization issues.
Thus, it is more practical to design an input-independent UAP.
We propose an algorithm to design the UAP using PCA. We
assume that the adversary collects some arbitrary set of inputs
{r(1)t , r(2)t , · · ·, r(N)t } and associated labels. The adversary
generates perturbations {δ(1), δ(2), · · ·, δ(N)} with respect to
the obtained arbitrary set of inputs and the exact channel
information using schemes from the previous sections. To
reflect the common characteristics of {δ(1), δ(2), · · ·, δ(N)}
in the UAP, we stack these perturbations into a matrix and
perform PCA to find the first component of the matrix with
the largest eigenvalue. Hence, we use the direction of the first
principal component as the direction of UAP for channelHar.
The algorithm for the UAP with N pre-collected input data is
similar to Algorithm 3. The difference is that there are N pre-
collected data inputs instead of N realizations of the channel.
B. Universal Adversarial Attack with Limited Channel Infor-
mation
Now, we further relax the assumption that the adversary
knows the exact channel between the adversary and the
receiver, and assume that the adversary only knows the distri-
bution of this channel. To design the UAP knowing the distri-
bution of the channel, we first generate random realizations of
the channel {H(1)ar ,H(2)ar , ···,H(N)ar } from the distribution. Then
we generate δ(n) using r
(n)
t andH
(n)
ar instead of using the real
channelHar and real input rt. Again, we use PCA to find the
first component of the matrix and use it as our direction of
UAP. The algorithm for UAP with limited channel information
is analogous to Algorithm 3 except that we have pre-collected
input data as opposed to real input data in Algorithm 3.
C. Black-box Universal Adversarial Attack
The last assumption that we will relax is the information
about the classifier at the receiver. To relax this assumption,
we use the well-known transferability property of adversarial
attacks [19]. This property states that the adversarial attack
crafted to fool a specific DNN can also fool other DNNs with
different architectures, with high probability. Therefore, the
adversary generates UAPs using a substitute DNN and uses
them to fool the actual DNN at the receiver.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We compare the performance of attacks proposed in this
paper and another attack from [10]. We use VT-CNN2 clas-
sifier used in [9] and [10], and train it with GNU radio
ML dataset RML2016.10a [20]. The dataset contains 220,000
samples. Each sample corresponds to one specific modulation
scheme at a specific signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). There are
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11 modulations: BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, QAM16, QAM64,
CPFSK, GFSK, PAM4, WBFM, AM-SSB and AM-DSB.
Also, we follow the same setup of [9], using Keras with
TensorFlow backend, where the modulation classifier at the
receiver estimates the modulation after receiving 128 I/Q (in-
phase/quadrature) channel symbols. We assume that the chan-
nel between the adversary and the receiver is Rayleigh fading
with path-loss and shadowing, i.e., har = K(
d0
d
)γψhray
where K = 1, d0 = 1, d = 10, γ = 2.7, ψ ∼ Lognormal(0, 8)
and hray ∼ Rayleigh(0, 1).
Here, we use perturbation-to-noise ratio (PNR) metric from
[10] that shows the relative perturbation power with respect to
the noise and measure how the increase in the PNR affects the
accuracy of the classifier. Note that as the PNR increases, it is
more likely to be detected by the receiver. In the figures, we
denote targeted attack by TA and non-targeted attack NTA.
Fig. 1 presents the accuracy of the classifier versus PNR
under the proposed targeted white-box adversarial attacks with
exact channel information and the adversarial attack studied
in [10]. As expected, the white-box attack in [10] considering
only the AWGN channel has poor performance that is close
to no attack case in low PNR region. The reason is that the
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Fig. 3. Classifier accuracy using the UAP with different levels of information
availability when SNR = 10 dB.
wireless channel changes the phase and the magnitude of the
perturbation at the receiver. Further, we see that the targeted
channel inversion attack does not perform well compared to
the targeted MRPP attack, indicating the importance of the
received power at the classifier.
The performance of the proposed white-box attacks is
compared in Fig. 2. As discussed in Section IV.B, λ can be
optimized by using a line search method and it can be seen
that the targeted MMSE attack performs better with λ = 1.2
compared to λ = 1. Furthermore, we observe that the non-
targeted MRPP attack outperforms other attacks. This can
be explained by the freedom of the direction that the non-
targeted adversarial attack can take. For targeted attacks, we
can only have 10 different directions since we have 11 mod-
ulation types, however, the non-targeted attacks do not have
such restriction. Thus, it is more likely that the non-targeted
attacks choose a better direction to enforce misclassification.
Moreover, the computation complexity for non-targeted attacks
is lower compared to the targeted attacks that involve iterations
to reach the desired accuracy.
In Fig. 3, we investigate the performance of the adversarial
attacks with respect to different levels of information avail-
ability. First, we observe that the UAP with 40 pre-collected
inputs, where the adversary knows the exact channel informa-
tion, outperforms other attacks with limited information. This
result shows the importance of the channel state information
over the exact input data when crafting an adversarial attack.
Note that the UAP with 40 pre-collected input data even out-
performs the targeted channel inversion attack in the high PNR
region, where the adversary knows not only the exact channel
but also the exact input at the receiver. Furthermore, similar
performance of the UAP with limited channel information and
the black-box UAP shows transferability of adversarial attack,
where for black-box UAP we use the same structure of the
classifier but train it differently.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We considered the wireless communication system, where
DL algorithms are used to classify radio signals and showed
that adversarial attacks against a modulation classifier are
effective even when there are channel effects beyond the
AWGN channel. Specifically, we considered both targeted
attack and non-targeted attacks, and observed in the simula-
tion results that DNNs used for modulation classification are
vulnerable to these attacks. Furthermore, even with limited
information, we show that the UAP can be generated to
enforce misclassification at the receiver.
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